Research projects

Principal Investigator


Project Member

Journal Articles

          Akratic beliefs and seemings
          Australasian Journal of Philosophy (2025)

[Accepted version | Published version]

          One-factor versus two-factor theory of delusion: Replies to Sullivan-Bissett and Noordhof
          Neuroethics (2025) 18, Article number: 4

[Open access]  * This is a peer-reviewed response to a commentary on my 2023 paper in Neuroethics.

          The dark side of clarity
          The Southern Journal of Philosophy (2024)

[Open access]

Revisiting Maher’s one-factor theory of delusion
Neuroethics (2023) 16, Article number: 15
[Open access]​ * A short version for a general audience is posted on Imperfect Cognitions.

          Can a bodily theorist of pain speak Mandarin?
          Philosophia (2023) 51, 261–272
          [Open access]

          Continuing commentary: challenges or misunderstandings? A defence of the two-factor theory against the challenges to its logic.
          Cognitive Neuropsychiatry (2019) 24(4): 300-307
          [Accepted version | Published version]

          Delusional beliefs, two-factor theories, and bizarreness
          Frontiers of Philosophy in China (2016) 11(2): 263-278
          [Accepted version | Published version]

Book Chapters

          Measuring delusional experiences
          In M. S. Overgaard & A. Kirkeby-Hinrup (Eds.), Subjective Measures in Clinical Contexts. Oxford University Press. (commissioned) 

         Why rational people obstinately hold onto irrational beliefs: A new approach.
          In E. Schmidt & M. Grajner (Eds.), Epistemic Dilemmas and Epistemic Normativity. Routledge. (commissioned)









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