Research projects
Principal Investigator
Leverhulme Trust Early Career Fellowship. Title: ‘Incredible Beliefs: Understanding Clear-Eyed Believing Against the Evidence’. 2024-2027
Marie Skłodowska-Curie COFUND postdoctoral project/POLONEZ BIS 2. Title: ‘Delusional Experiences and Evidence’. 2023.05-09.
Project Member
National Social Science Fund of China––Young Scholars Project. Title: ‘A Philosophical Study of Perceptual Biases in Social Cognition’. PI: Jie Lu, Zhejiang Chinese Medical University. 2024-2029.
Journal Articles
Akratic beliefs and seemings
Australasian Journal of Philosophy (2025)
[Accepted version | Published version]
One-factor versus two-factor theory of delusion: Replies to Sullivan-Bissett and Noordhof
Neuroethics (2025) 18, Article number: 4
[Open access] * This is a peer-reviewed response to a commentary on my 2023 paper in Neuroethics.
The dark side of clarity
The Southern Journal of Philosophy (2024)
[Open access]
Revisiting Maher’s one-factor theory of delusion
Neuroethics (2023) 16, Article number: 15
[Open access] * A short version for a general audience is posted on Imperfect Cognitions.
Can a bodily theorist of pain speak Mandarin?
Philosophia (2023) 51, 261–272
[Open access]
Continuing commentary: challenges or misunderstandings? A defence of the two-factor theory against the challenges to its logic.
Cognitive Neuropsychiatry (2019) 24(4): 300-307
[Accepted version | Published version]
Delusional beliefs, two-factor theories, and bizarreness
Frontiers of Philosophy in China (2016) 11(2): 263-278
[Accepted version | Published version]
Book Chapters
Measuring delusional experiences
In M. S. Overgaard & A. Kirkeby-Hinrup (Eds.), Subjective Measures in Clinical Contexts. Oxford University Press. (commissioned)
Why rational people obstinately hold onto irrational beliefs: A new approach.
In E. Schmidt & M. Grajner (Eds.), Epistemic Dilemmas and Epistemic Normativity. Routledge. (commissioned)
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