Peer-reviewed Publications

Akratic Beliefs and Seemings
Australasian Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)

[Accepted version]

Revisiting Maher’s one-factor theory of delusion
Neuroethics (2023) 16, Article number: 15
[Open access]​

*A shorter version for a general audience is posted on Imperfect Cognitions.

*This paper recently received an intriguing commentary by Ema Sullivan-Bissett and Paul Noordhof (2024). My responses are in preparation.

Can a bodily theorist of pain speak Mandarin?
Philosophia (2023) 51, 261–272
[Open access]

Continuing commentary: challenges or misunderstandings? A defence of the two-factor theory against the challenges to its logic.
Cognitive Neuropsychiatry (2019) 24(4): 300-307
[Accepted version | Published version]

Delusional beliefs, two-factor theories, and bizarreness
Frontiers of Philosophy in China (2016) 11(2): 263-278
[Accepted version | Published version]

Previous research project

Principal Investigator of a postdoctoral project entitled ''Delusional Experiences and Evidence''. (2023)

(no. 2022/45/P/HS1/02793; co-funded by the National Science Centre and the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement no. 945339.)

PhD thesis

Understanding delusions: evidence, reason, and experience
Department of Philosophy, University of Warwick (2022)
[Warwick Library e-thesis]


This thesis develops a novel framework for explaining delusions.

In Chapter 1, I introduce the two fundamental challenges posed by delusions: the evidence challenge lies in explaining the flagrant ways delusions flout evidence; and the specificity challenge lies in explaining the fact that patients’ delusions are often about a few specific themes, and patients rarely have a wide range of delusional or odd beliefs.

In Chapter 2, I discuss the strengths and weaknesses of current theories of delusions, which typically appeal to one or both of two factors: anomalous experience and reasoning abnormality. I argue that anomalous experience can help explain the specificity of delusions, but has difficulties in addressing the evidence challenge; reasoning abnormality can help address the evidence challenge, but has difficulties in explaining the specificity of delusions. This suggests that there may be an important factor that has not been captured by current theories of delusions.

To search for this missing factor, in Chapter 3, I turn to normal believing. Inspired by the literature on Cartesian clarity and phenomenal dogmatism, I develop a dual-force framework of believing, according to which beliefs can be understood as the results of the interaction between the justificatory force and causal force of evidence and the justificatory force and causal force of clear experience, in which something clearly seems to be so to the subject. This framework suggests that the missing factor may be the clear experience with its distinctive phenomenal clarity that compels assent.

In Chapter 4, I return to delusions, and argue that the dual-force framework can help us to get a better grip on some personal descriptions of delusions; make progress in addressing the evidence and specificity challenges of delusions; and shed new light on the underpinnings of delusions. In the end, I conclude with some remaining questions for future study.

Peer-reviewed Presentations

Delusion and experience

Engaging Rationality Today

Lille University, France, 22-24 May, 2024

The dark side of clarity.

The 97th Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association

Birkbeck and The Institute of Philosophy, University of London, UK, 7-9 July 2023.

Delusion, two-factor theory and experience.

The 9th Congress of the Society for the Philosophy of Science
University of Paris Nanterre, France, 31 May - 2 June 2023.

Believing what we clearly perceive and being deluded.

The 28th Annual Meeting of the European Society for Philosophy and Psychology

Leipzig-Online, Germany, September 2021.

Jumping to delusions?.

The 27th Annual Meeting of the European Society for Philosophy and Psychology

Athens, Greece, September 2019.

When is a cognitive system immune to delusions?.*

Uniting Two Perspectives on Mental Illness: Philosophy and Linguistics

University of Essex, UK, September 2018.

Jena Summer Symposia in Philosophy

Institut für Philosophie, Friedrich Schiller Universität Jena, Germany, July 2018.

(*An abstract is posted on Imperfect Cognitions, December 2017)

Delusional beliefs and the origin of their contents.

London-Warwick Mind Forum

King’s College London, London, UK, November 2017.

Respondent: Jørgen Dyrstad

Invited Presentations

A new framework for explaining delusions

BIOUNCERTAINTY Research seminars

Interdisciplinary Centre for Ethics, Jagiellonian University, May 2023.

Delusional belief.
          Department of Philosophy Postgraduate Welcome Conference
          University of Warwick, UK, October 2021
          Respondent: Barney Walker

The triad of irrationality.
          Global Humanities: Language, Literature and History
          Department of History, University of Warwick, UK, January 2018.