Can a bodily theorist of pain speak Mandarin?
Continuing commentary: challenges or misunderstandings? A defence of the two-factor theory against the challenges to its logic.
Cognitive Neuropsychiatry (2019) 24(4): 300-307
[submitted | published]
Delusional beliefs, two-factor theories, and bizarreness
Frontiers of Philosophy in China (2016) 11(2): 263-278
[submitted | published]
Understanding delusions: evidence, reason, and experience
Department of Philosophy, University of Warwick (2022)
[Warwick Library e-thesis]
This thesis develops a novel framework for explaining delusions.
In Chapter 1, I introduce the two fundamental challenges posed by delusions: the evidence challenge lies in explaining the flagrant ways delusions flout evidence; and the specificity challenge lies in explaining the fact that patients’ delusions are often about a few specific themes, and patients rarely have a wide range of delusional or odd beliefs.
In Chapter 2, I discuss the strengths and weaknesses of current theories of delusions, which typically appeal to one or both of two factors: anomalous experience and reasoning abnormality. I argue that anomalous experience can help explain the specificity of delusions, but has difficulties in addressing the evidence challenge; reasoning abnormality can help address the evidence challenge, but has difficulties in explaining the specificity of delusions. This suggests that there may be an important factor that has not been captured by current theories of delusions.
To search for this missing factor, in Chapter 3, I turn to normal believing. Inspired by the literature on Cartesian clarity and phenomenal dogmatism, I develop a dual-force framework of believing, according to which beliefs can be understood as the results of the interaction between the justificatory force and causal force of evidence and the justificatory force and causal force of clear experience, in which something clearly seems to be so to the subject. This framework suggests that the missing factor may be the clear experience with its distinctive phenomenal clarity that compels assent.
In Chapter 4, I return to delusions, and argue that the dual-force framework can help us to get a better grip on some personal descriptions of delusions; make progress in addressing the evidence and specificity challenges of delusions; and shed new light on the underpinnings of delusions. In the end, I conclude with some remaining questions for future study.
Believing what we clearly perceive and being deluded.
The 28th Annual Meeting of the European Society for Philosophy and Psychology
Leipzig-Online, Germany, September 2021.
Jumping to delusions?.
The 27th Annual Meeting of the European Society for Philosophy and Psychology
Athens, Greece, September 2019.
When is a cognitive system immune to delusions?.*
Uniting Two Perspectives on Mental Illness: Philosophy and Linguistics
University of Essex, UK, September 2018.
Jena Summer Symposia in Philosophy
Institut für Philosophie, Friedrich Schiller Universität Jena, Germany, July 2018.
(*An abstract is posted on Imperfect Cognitions, December 2017)
Delusional beliefs and the origin of their contents.
King’s College London, London, UK, November 2017.
Respondent: Jørgen Dyrstad
Department of Philosophy Postgraduate Welcome Conference
University of Warwick, UK, October 2021
Respondent: Barney Walker
The triad of irrationality.
Global Humanities: Language, Literature and History
Department of History, University of Warwick, UK, January 2018.